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CITIZENS-REPRESENTATIVES CONGRUENCE 
CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
EVOLUTION DURING THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
JOSÉ REAL-DATO1 
ABSTRACT In this paper I analyze to what extent the Eurozone crisis has affected the 
representativeness of parties’ positions with respect to the issue of European integration. 
Public opinion data and many analyses have provided evidence that, since 2010, public 
support for the European Union (EU) has dramatically declined. In contrast, existing 
data on party positions indicates considerable stability in this area, particularly among 
mainstream parties. However, we still lack a comparative analysis of the evolution of 
citizens-representatives congruence since the start of the Eurozone crisis, and the factors 
that may affect variations in congruence levels. With this paper we fill this gap through 
using a unique dataset of parties and voter positions based on political elite and mass 
surveys carried out in nine EU countries in 2007, 2009 and 2014.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a considerable amount of work that, during the last years, has 
involved the study of the political consequences of the Great Recession 
and the Eurozone crisis in European countries, both in terms of electoral 
(Magalhães 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016) and party behavior (Mair 
2011), as well as in perceptions of the working of institutions by citizens. In 
particular, this strand of literature has found a relationship between the crisis 
and reduced levels of institutional support for national and EU institutions 
(Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia 2013; Roth et al. 2013, Armingeon and 
Ceka 2013) and satisfaction with democracy (Cordero and Simón 2015). 
1 José Real-Dato is associate professor at the University of Almería; e-mail: jreal@ual.es
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In this context, congruence between citizens and their representatives constitutes 
an interesting research topic. Since congruence is admitted to be a basic normative 
ingredient of democratic representation (though criticism of this stance exists – see 
below), one may wonder to what extent the crisis has affected congruence, both at 
the system and party level. Moreover, given the mediating effect of congruence on 
political attitudes, such as satisfaction with democracy (Reher 2015; Stecker and 
Tausendpfund 2016) and political behavior – i.e. voter turnout (Lefkofridi et al. 
2014; Reher 2014) –, we can also ask to what extent the variation in congruence 
during the crisis may have affected such attitudes in European countries. 
Some research has already analyzed the relationship between congruence and 
the crisis. Most of these studies focus on Southern European countries (Belchior 
et al. 2016; Freire et al. 2016). Their findings confirm that, in general terms, 
the positions of political representatives and citizens have diverged during the 
crisis.2 From a comparative perspective, Giger et al. (2016) show a decline in the 
congruence between parties and citizens with regard to the salience of specific 
issues in several countries during the crisis.
This chapter also focuses on how the crisis has affected congruence, but it 
does so specifically regarding the issue of European integration. Though there 
are some case studies that deal with this topic (reviewed later in this chapter), 
a comparative perspective is still lacking. In the next pages I answer the 
following questions: How has congruence as regards the EU evolved during 
the crisis, and how is this evolution related to the specific economic situation 
in each country?
These questions will be answered through a focus on different aspects of the 
concept. In order to provide a more complete view of the effects of the crisis on 
the relationship between the preferences of citizens and their representatives, I 
will focus on both system – (citizens-representatives) and party-level (voters-
party representatives) congruence, and also take into account some different 
conceptualizations of congruence. In contrast with most congruence studies 
(which adopt a more limited conceptual scope), the focus on different views of 
congruence guarantees a more robust answer to the above-mentioned questions, 
allowing me at the same time to ascertain whether the different concepts of 
congruence actually refer to the same phenomenon. 
Another innovative aspect of this study has to do with the data used in the 
analyses. Though information about representatives’ positions have been 
2  However, congruence has increased in some cases. Belchior et al. (2016) find greater levels of 
congruence between deputies and representatives on issues concerning representation – with 
deputies and citizens both moving towards a more participatory-mandatory view of representation 
(p. 13). In Spain, Real-Dato (2017) finds that political representatives and citizens have become 
closer with respect to their degree of identification with the EU.
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usually obtained through alternative means (Comparative Manifestos Project 
data, experts surveys and citizens’ placements of parties) (Powell 2009), this 
chapter follows the lead of recent studies that have used surveys of political 
representatives to compute their positions (Freire et al., 2014; Dolný and Baboš, 
2015; but also see Marsh and Wessels, 1997). 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section I deal with the concept of 
congruence, offering some clarifications concerning its meaning and theoretical 
significance within the framework of democratic government. This includes 
an explanation of the theoretical and empirical difficulties it generates. In the 
third section I introduce the hypotheses that are tested concerning the evolution 
of congruence about the EU during the crisis. These hypotheses are based on 
previous studies on this topic which have underlined the growing importance of 
congruence between citizens and representatives concerning the understanding 
of contemporary democratic governance in the EU. The fourth section presents 
the data and methods used in the analysis, paying particular attention to the 
description of the different conceptualizations of congruence and their respective 
operationalizations. The fifth section presents the results of the analysis, and in the 
last section I summarize and discuss the main findings of the paper.
ON THE CONCEPT OF CONGRUENCE
A basic understanding of political “congruence” refers to the correspondence 
between the preferences of citizens (or groups thereof) and the positions (and, 
ultimately, actions) of their political representatives (Powell 2004; 2014). 
From a normative point of view, the degree of congruence between these 
actors has been considered a basic indicator of the quality of democracy. A 
correspondence between the preferences of citizens and the positions and actions 
of their representatives constitutes a basic feature (but not the only one) of the 
mechanism of representation and delegation of political decision-making that 
democracy implies (Miller and Stokes 1963; Pitkin 1963; Strøm 2000; Powell 
2004; 2014). Proponents of the responsible party government model state that 
the adequate functioning of representative democracy requires that voters vote 
for those parties whose policy platforms are closer to voter preferences (Dalton 
1985; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Adams 2001)
Such a view of representation requires that the preferences and positions of 
the represented and their representatives can be reduced to a single dimension 
– otherwise they could not be compared nor matched. This dimension has been 
usually ideology (Thomassen 1994; Powell 2004). 
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The study of congruence, however, is not exempt from problems. Firstly, 
the concept must confront theoretical criticisms related to its actual relevance 
for understanding and evaluating the democratic representation process. The 
theoretical importance of congruence is basically related to a populist view 
of democracy (Luttbeg 1974; Dahl 1982), where there is an identity between 
the will of the people and the actions of government. In this view, the role 
of representatives would be basically that of translating citizens’ views into 
decisions. However, this is not the only way to conceive neither democracy nor 
the representative link (Eulau et al. 1959; Riker 1982; Thomassen 1994; Bartels 
and Achen 2016). Congruence plays no role, for instance, in Schumpeter’s 
view of democracy (Schumpeter 1976), where democracy is contemplated as a 
competition of political elites to be elected to policy-making positions; nor in the 
view of representation based on retrospective voting (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981), 
where citizens evaluate not the proximity of candidates to their positions, but 
the performance of representatives’ decisions.
Therefore, the theoretical relevance of congruence is dependent on the 
assumption that the functioning of democracy adjusts to the model of populist 
democracy – more specifically that of responsible party government. Though 
there is much debate if this is empirically the case (Achen and Bartels 2016), the 
populist view of democracy still constitutes a widely spread normative model of 
substantive democratic representation, as the extensive literature on this topic 
demonstrates (Powell 2014).
Apart from the above-mentioned criticisms, the study of congruence 
usually confronts two basic types of operational difficulties – conceptual, 
and of measurement (Golder and Stramski 2010; Powell 2014). Conceptually, 
there are five basic issues: 1) Who the representatives and the represented are: 
governments, parliaments or parties, or individuals from the former group; all 
citizens, the electorate, voters or party supporters from the latter; 2) the level 
at which representation is being evaluated: system-level, subsystem-level or 
party-level; 3) how the ‘congruence’ relationship itself is being understood: as a 
relationship between a specific group of represented people (including the whole 
community) and their representatives, no matter how we define them (a many-to-
one relationship, using Golder and Stramski’s term [2010]); or as a relationship 
between the group of represented individuals and the whole representative 
body (a many-to-many relationship); 4) what attributes characterize such 
relationships: attitudes, preferences or issue emphasis of the represented vis à 
vis representatives’ positions, issue emphasis, specific pledges, decisions (i.e. 
budgetary decisions) or actions; and, last but not least, 5) Which dimensions of 
representation are relevant (ideology or other general dimensions, or specific 
policy issues). Clearly, the different combination of responses to these five 
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issues depends on the theoretical perspective adopted by the researcher and the 
questions she is interested in answering. For instance, asking to what extent some 
parties or countries are more or less congruent, or to what extent a parliament 
is congruent with the preferences of the whole population (or electorate), are 
very different questions that imply different understandings of congruence 
(one-to-many and many-to-many, respectively) (Golder and Stramski 2010). 
Such variation in research questions thus also allows for very varied research 
designs and conceptualizations of congruence, which lessen the comparability 
of results. 
These difficulties are increased when considering measurement issues (Powell 
2009). Different conceptual choices involve different measurement options 
in terms of: 1) Who is going to be measured (depending on the subjects who 
form the representation dyad); 2) what is going to be measured (for instance, 
the distance between the median-represented individual and the representative’s 
position;  between each represented individual and representatives’ position; or 
the distribution of preferences of both represented and representatives3; some 
authors even claim that the focus should be on the preferences of the median 
individual within the majority [Powell 2014:11]); 3) how measurements are 
computed mathematically4; or 4) from where the information for elaborating 
measurements is obtained (i.e. from measuring representatives’ preferences 
through surveys, documents, or the views of those who they represent). 
Moreover, 5) there are also measurement problems linked to the issues of the 
commensurability between represented individuals and representatives (even 
if they are represented using the same scale), the comparability of positions in 
different contexts and time periods, and the validity of the sources utilized to 
measure congruence (Powell 2009).
Given these difficulties, the only solution that facilitates the interpretation 
of results is for the research design to clearly state which conceptual and 
measurement choices have been made; i.e., for the researcher to be explicit about 
how the results could have been differently extrapolated if other choices had 
been made. The decisions I have made in the research for this paper regarding 
the conceptualization and measurement of congruence are explained in the two 
next sections, respectively.
3  These three options are referred to by Golder and Stramski (2010) respectively as 1) average citizen 
congruence, 2) absolute and relative citizen congruence (the difference is that the second one takes 
into account the dispersion of citizens’ preferences), and 3) congruence (many-to-many).
4  Golder and Stramski’s (2010) formula for computing many-to-many congruence differs from that 
provided by Andeweg (2011). The same applies to Golder and Stramski’s method of calculating 
relative citizen congruence compared to that elaborated by Achen (1978).
90
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
JOSÉ REAL-DATO
CONGRUENCE IN TERMS OF THE EU AND THE CRISIS
In the context of the European Union, the congruence of positions between 
citizens and their representatives regarding the process of European integration 
has become of paramount importance during the last two decades. In this period, 
a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) has been substituted 
by a ‘constraining dissensus’ around EU issues (Hooghe and Marks 2009), 
with the EU being elevated as a dimension of political confrontation in many 
European countries, with substantial independence from (though sometimes 
interrelated with) the classic dimension of political conflict – ideology (Hix and 
Lord 1997; Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Bakker et al. 2012; Costello et al. 
2012; Dalton 2015). 
As citizens and their representatives have increasingly paid attention to EU 
issues in public discussion and political arenas, it makes sense to incorporate 
congruence as a criterion for the overall quality of political representation. 
Understanding the congruence between citizens’ and political representatives’ 
preferences and positions with respect to the EU helps to illuminate how this 
issue fits into the democratic representation relationship and is intimately related 
to one of the most important problems with the functioning of the EU – namely, 
the democratic deficit and its negative consequences for political legitimacy 
(Katz 2001; Rose 2013). Greater levels of incongruence could signal these 
problems and, probably, are also one of their causes. Conversely, congruence 
between citizens and representatives (particularly at the government and 
European Parliament levels) could constitute an important remedy for those 
problems (Mair and Thomassen 2010). 
However, accommodating the EU dimension into the democratic representation 
relationship is not easy. Mattila and Raunio (2012) have stressed that mainstream 
parties have been reluctant to plan the ‘EU card’ in political competition, it being 
considered a secondary issue. This situation has been associated both with the 
longstanding support among those parties for the European integration process 
in the context of the above-mentioned ‘permissive consensus’, but also because 
of the uncertainty of the consequences that incorporating a new dimension 
of political conflict could entail in terms of electoral support. This is why the 
politicization of EU integration has been led by smaller, non-governing parties 
who emphasize their Eurosceptic positions (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), and 
why during the 2000s there was an increase in the distance between parties and 
voters on this issue.
This involves a change from the situation in the 1990s. Despite this secondary 
importance awarded the dimension of EU integration and the dominance 
of ideology in the configuration of the European political space, studies that 
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focused on EU congruence during that decade found a considerable degree of 
convergence between citizens and their representatives, at least with respect 
to general support for European integration (Eijk and Franklin 1991, 2004; 
Marsh and Wessels 1997; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; 1999; Schmitt and 
Thomassen 2000). This scenario started to change in the late 1990s and 2000s. 
Eijk and Franklin (2004) found that, in 1999, the range of policy choices parties 
offered regarding EU issues was less varied compared to the preferences of 
citizens, entailing the potential for the subsequent politicization of the European 
dimension by political entrepreneurs. Mattila and Raunio (2006), using data 
gathered in 2004, showed that parties were closer to their voters on the left-
right dimension than they were in respect of EU integration. Five years later, 
the picture had hardly changed, with parties further drifting apart from voters, 
and smaller and extreme-left wing parties having become more congruent with 
their voters in terms of EU issues (Mattila and Raunio 2012). Using the same 
European Election Survey data, Costello et al. (2012) and Otero (2014) showed 
that there were more differences between parties and their voters as regards the 
EU than with respect to ideology. With data also gathered in 2009, but from a 
different source (the INTUNE project) and with a different conceptualization 
of congruence, Dolný and Baboš (2015) found that, surprisingly, system-level 
congruence between representatives and citizens was higher with respect to EU 
support than with respect to ideological positions. 
Regarding the congruence of positions concerning EU integration, some 
of the above-mentioned works also deal with this topic. Country studies such 
as that of Freire et al. (2014) show that congruence in this dimension has 
also declined in three of the countries more severely hit by the crisis (Spain, 
Greece and Portugal), mostly because of the increasing Euroscepticism among 
citizens.5 
This paper offers a more complete view of the evolution of congruence as 
applied to European integration during the years of the crisis by providing a 
comparative analysis of the positions of citizens and MPs of several EU countries 
in the period 2007-2014. In this respect, we elaborate on three basic hypotheses.
Since the existing evidence has shown that the stances of MPs towards the 
EU have hardly changed during these years (Vogel and Rodríguez-Teruel 
2016), and several pieces of research have found increasing Euroscepticism 
among the public (Serricchio et al. 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Braun and 
Tausendpfund 2014; Clements and Nanou 2014), it is expected thatcongruence 
5  According to the articles in a special issue edited by Vogel and Rodríguez-Teruel (2016), political 
representatives and parties in several European countries (including those studied by Real-Dato 
[2017]) and Freire et al. (2014) hardly modified their positions about this issue during the crisis.
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on EU issues has decreased since the crisis. I thus elaborate the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Congruence between citizens and national MPs has 
significantly decreased since 2009.
As stated in the Introduction, this article also aims at probing the connection 
between the specific national economic situation and the evolution of congruence 
in each country. In this respect, the crisis has not hit all EU countries in the same 
fashion. Due to the economic downturn that started in 2008 due to the Great 
Recession, the significant financial problems for the public sectors and banking 
systems of several EU countries led to a sovereign debt crisis. This led most 
governments to adopt, under the strong recommendation of EU institutions, 
austerity policies and, in some cases, to ask for external financial assistance. 
Those countries that participated in financial assistance programs (Cyprus 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Latvia and Romania) were subject 
to conditionality measures by the institutions that managed the programs (the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF) that involved 
greater cuts in public spending (particularly in social policies). In some of these 
countries (Spain and Greece) EU support decreased dramatically as government 
parties had to ‘sell’ the unpalatable measures to their citizens. Therefore, we 
expect that in countries subject to financial assistance programs the decrease in 
congruence will be even more pronounced. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Congruence between citizens and national MPs has 
decreased more acutely in countries subject to financial assistance programs.
The third hypothesis relates to the evolution of congruence in new and old EU 
member states (respectively, those countries that accessed the EU in the 2003 
enlargement or later, and those which accessed before). Apart from the influence 
of institutional variables on congruence about EU issues (not tested here), previous 
studies have identified significant differences between these groups of countries 
in the degree of agreement between citizens and representatives on this issue. For 
example, Mattila and Raunio (2006) found (in contrast to their initial hypothesis) 
that in 2004 congruence concerning EU integration was higher (almost perfect) 
between voters and parties in new member states than in old ones. This result was 
not confirmed using data from 2009: the authors found that levels of congruence 
in new member states for EU issues had by then slightly decreased below those of 
old member states (Mattila and Raunio 2012). Therefore, I also test if during the 
crisis there was any change in this state of affairs: 
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Hypothesis 3(H3): Levels of congruence in old and new member states 
remained similar during the crisis (congruence was still lower in new 
member states).
In the next section I present the data and the measurements used in the analysis. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The positions of representatives are obtained using data from the two waves of 
the INTUNE elite survey in 2007 and 2009 (Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012) 
and its continuation in the ENEC project in 2014 (http://enec-2014.wixsite.com/
enec-2014). The use of surveys to capture the positions of representatives offer a 
number of advantages compared with other existing alternatives – namely, party 
manifestos, expert surveys, and citizens’ placements of parties believed position 
(Powell 2009). On the one hand, party manifestos usually reflect strategic 
projections that mostly focus on their reception of party policy positions by 
the electorate. This means that these strategic positions may eventually diverge 
from actual ones due to the incorporation of elements of opportunism and 
propaganda. Besides this fact, parties probably avoid dealing with some issues in 
their manifestos (for instance, those that might create division within the party). 
On the other hand, expert surveys and citizens’ placements may be conditioned 
by the salience of particular debates in the public or political arena, as well as 
mediated by the media. Moreover, citizen’ placements and expert views may 
mutually influence each other. Thus, surveys of party elites probably capture a 
more accurate picture of the actual policy positions of their organizations. 
The surveys I use were implemented on representative samples of national 
MPs in several EU countries to collect information about their attitudes and 
positions towards the EU. The INTUNE elite surveys ran in parallel with two 
mass surveys that had many questions in common with the former. For 2007 and 
2009 I was only able to use the surveys from the INTUNE project to ascertain 
the congruence between elites and citizens concerning EU integration (this is, 
for instance, also what Dolný and Baboš [2015] do in their article using the 
2009 INTUNE surveys). However, the ENEC project in 2014 did not involve 
carrying out the corresponding mass survey in the participating countries. One 
alternative was to use data for 2014 from another prior or simultaneous mass 
survey containing similar questions (i.e. EES 2014 or the sixth or seventh round 
of the European Social Survey [ESS]). However, for sake of comparability I 
used the same source for citizens in 2007 and 2009. Since the EES 2004 was in 
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many ways different from the INTUNE elite survey, and the fieldwork for EES 
2009 took place after the INTUNE elite survey, I finally decided to use the ESS 
data corresponding to the third, fourth and sixth rounds that formally took place 
in 2006, 2008 and 20126. The actual dates of fieldwork for the countries in the 
analysis in these rounds are much closer to the dates of the fieldwork of the elite 
surveys (see Table 1).7 Data and information about the samples are shown in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Table 1. Fieldwork for INTUNE and ENEC elite surveys, and ESS surveys.
Country Fieldwork for INTUNE-ENEC elite survey 
Fieldwork European 
Social Survey (ESS) 
Rounds 3 (2006), 4 
(2008) and 6 (2012)
Fieldwork for European 
Election Survey (EES) wave 
(2004, 2009, 2014)(*)
Bulgaria Jan-May 2007 and 2009Nov-Dec 2014
Nov 2006-Jan 2007
Mar 2009-May 2009
Feb 2013-Apr 2013
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
France Jan-May 2007 and 2009 Feb-Aug 2014
Sep 2006-Apr 2007
Sep 2008-Jan 2009
Feb 2013-Jun 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Germany Jan-May 2007 and 2009Oct-Dec 2014 
Sep 2006-Jan 2007
Aug 2008-Jan 2009
Sep 2012-Jan 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Hungary Jan-May 2007 and 2009Sep-Dec 2014
Nov 2006-Jan 2007
Feb 2009-Apr 2009
Nov 2012-Feb 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Italy Jan-May 2007 and 2009 Jan-Mar 2014 Jun 2013-Dec 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Lithuania Jan-May 2009May-Jun 2014
Oct 2009 – Jan 2010
May 2013 – Aug 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Portugal
January-May 2007 and 
2009
February-June 2014
Oct 2006-Feb 2007
Oct 2008-Mar 2009
Oct 2012-Mar 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Spain
January-May 2007 and 
2009
October-December 2014
Oct 2006-Mar 2007
Oct 2008-Mar 2009
Oct 2012-Mar 2013
Jun 2004-Jan 2005
Jun-Jul 2009
May 2014-Jun 2014
Slovenia January-May 2014 Oct 2012-Dec 2012 May 2014-Jun 2014
Note: the EES 2014 did not include Bulgaria; 
6  I used the INTUNE mass survey data in the case of Italy in 2007 and 2009, since the 3rd and 4th 
rounds of the ESS were not implemented in this country.
7  Most of the fieldwork for the 7th round of the ESS was implemented after the ENEC fieldwork. 
The only country in which the 5th round of the ESS was carried out after the INTUNE elite survey 
was Lithuania.
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The INTUNE elite and the ESS surveys contained the same question, which I 
have used to obtain MPs and citizens positions. This question asks respondents 
to indicate their opinion using a 0 -10 scale, where 0 means that ‘[European] 
unification has gone too far’ and 10 that ‘[European] unification should go 
further’.8 It is evident that both representatives’ and citizens’ positions about 
the EU are more complex, and that the levels of congruence for the measure I 
have chosen may not correspond to ideas about other features of the European 
integration process and the architecture and functioning of the EU (see Best, 
Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012; Sanders, Bellucci, Tóka and Torcal 2012). 
However, it is not possible here to consider these other aspects since alternative 
questions are not available for both groups of surveys. In any case, the question 
I focus on can be considered an accurate reflection of general attitudes towards 
the process of European integration.
Regarding congruence measures, I consider them in two levels: system 
(congruence between citizens [C] and the position representing all representatives 
[R]) and party level (congruence between party voters [V] and the parties 
they vote for [P]).  At the system level I compute two types of congruence 
measures. The first one reflect an understanding of congruence as a many-to-
one relationship (Golder and Stramski 2010) – that is, emphasizing how far/
close an ideal representative is to a represented group (in this case, citizens). 
More specifically, I focus on the relative citizen congruence (RCC) (Golder and 
Stramski 2010, 96) (equation 1). This measure represents the average absolute 
distance between R (the average position of representatives) and Ci (the position 
of each individual citizen), relative to the dispersion of citizens’ positions with 
respect to their most preferred position – that is, the citizen median position 
(MC). In mathematical terms:
(1)
This measure ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 implies absolute congruence – the 
ideological location of R minimizes the sum of absolute distances between the 
citizens.
8  The question wording in the INTUNE-ENEC and the ESS is slightly different. In the ESS it says: 
“Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others 
say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your 
position?” In the INTUNE-ENEC elite surveys the wording is: “Some say European unification 
should be strengthened. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please 
indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, ‘0’ means unification “has already gone 
too far” and ‘10’ means it “should be strengthened”. What number on this scale best describes your 
position?”
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As I have mentioned above, one of the operational problems with congruence 
has to do with the measure to be used. Compared to other alternatives to measure 
the many-to-one congruence, such as the absolute median citizen congruence 
(the one most frequently used in congruence studies) and the absolute citizen 
congruence9 , the RCC has the advantage of both taking into account the 
distribution of positions among citizens and allowing for comparisons between 
countries (Golder and Stramski 2010: 94).10 
Along with how the positions of individual citizens match those of specific 
ideal representatives (one-to-many congruence), I am also interested in 
how well the different positions/preferences in a representative body match 
those of the represented population. Here, instead of the measure proposed 
by Golder and Stramski (2010, 96) I follow the one proposed by Andeweg 
(2011), which is:
9   The absolute median citizen congruence (AMCC), compares the absolute distance between R and 
the median citizen (MC). The formula is (Golder and Stramski 2010, 96): 
where R is the average position of MPs by country at each moment (survey). Therefore, the lower 
the AMCC, the higher the congruence.
 The absolute citizen congruence (ACC) compares the average absolute distance between R and 
each citizen Ci. As in the AMCC, lower scores indicate higher congruence. The formula is (Golder 
and Stramski 2010, 96):
10  The average median citizen congruence has been criticized, since it does not take into account the 
distribution of positions among citizens, while average citizen congruence does. However, both 
of these measures are absolute measures of congruence – that is, they only consider the absolute 
distance or the average absolute distance between R and MC or C, and do not take into account 
the dispersion of C in each country. In contrast, relative citizen congruence does take into account 
such dispersion. When doing this, what the RCC does is to compare the distances between R and 
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Andeweg’s many-to-many congruence compares the distribution functions of 
citizens (Fc) and representatives (FR). The index would be the sum at each point 
of the 0-10 scale (or whatever the range in a non-continuous scale) of the lower 
percentage between Fc (x) (the proportion of citizens that place themselves at 
point x) and FR (x) (the proportion of representatives that place themselves at 
the same point). In the case that Fc (x) = FR (x), either of them (in the formula, Fc (x)) should be added to the sum. In other words, Andeweg’s many-to-many 
congruence index measures the common overlap between the two distribution 
functions. So, the higher the percentage of overlap between the two distributions, 
the higher the congruence.
For the party-level analysis, I only consider the many-to-one measure, in 
this case, the relative voter-party congruence (RVC). I do not include many-
to-many congruence because this is a measure mostly designed to account 
for the representativeness of systemic political bodies. I also examine the 
responsiveness measure suggested by Achen (1978) and used in several 
studies (i.e. Dalton 1985; 2015; Mattila and Raunio 2006; 2012). This 
measure is computed as
Responsiveness (Achen):  P = a + bV (5)
where the equation represents the regression of the average party 
position P on the mean voter position V. Perfect congruence occurs when 
the intercept a=0 and the coefficient b=1. An intercept a ≠ 0 implies an 
inbuilt positional bias in the parties with respect to the voters, while the 
coefficient b indicates the degree of convergence/divergence between 
parties and voters (b > 1 indicates that parties tend to be more polarized 
than voters, while b < 1 implies the opposite: that voters are more polarized 
than their representatives).
In order to compute parties’ and voters’ positions, the studies I have consulted 
use different criteria. For instance, despite the fact that all of them use EES data, 
Costello et al. (2012) employ quite conservative criterion as they include only 
those parties where  at least 50 voters and 5 candidates were interviewed, while 
Dalton (2015) analyzes parties with 20 or more voters and 2 or more candidates, 
and Raunio and Mattila (2012) include in their analysis parties with 10 or more 
voters (they use voters’ placements of parties). The criterion I use in the analysis 
described in this article lies somewhere in-between those mentioned above. I 
analyze parties where at least 25 party voters and 5 MPs were interviewed. In 
fact, this means that I am considering mostly parties with a relevant share of the 
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seats in their respective parliament, given the characteristics of the sample.11 
The parties are included in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis at a system level. The two measures 
of congruence are highly and significantly correlated (Spearman’s rho =  -0.92, 
p=0.000). So, independently of the specific computational characteristics, these 
variables clearly measure the same phenomenon. 
Table 2. Different measures of congruence between citizens and MPs regarding EU 
issues (by country and year)
 RCC MTMC 
Bulgaria 2007 0.09 72.06
2009 0.04 78.52
2014 0.02 83.97
France 2007 0.19 62.59
2009 0.23 58.26
2014 0.23 54.34
Germany 2007 0.29 51.55
2009 0.27 52.89
2014 0.19 65.09
Hungary 2007 0.18 71.73
2009 0.20 63.26
2014 0.01 83.54
Italy 2007 0.02 76.97
2009 0.00 81.52
2014 0.12 62.26
Lithuania 2009 0.06 82.41
2014 0.00 80.98
Portugal 2007 0.12 69.01
2009 0.12 73.31
2014 0.21 59.03
Spain 2007 0.26 51.04
2009 0.32 54.41
2014 0.23 58.92
Slovenia 2014 0.16 75.35
Note: RCC: Relative citizen congruence (many-to-one measure); MTMC: Andeweg’s many-to-many congruence.
11  The theoretical sample size in INTUNE was set at 80 MPs per parliament . In ENEC, this sample size 
was kept for larger parliamentary assemblies (above 300 seats) and 50 in the rest. So, for instance, in 
the case of ENEC, a sample of 5 MPs for a party was equivalent to a party parliamentary group of 39 
members in the Bundestag (a 6% of the 631 members of the chamber); and to a group of 12 in Croatia 
(where final sample size was set at 60) where the Sabor has 151 members (8% of the chamber).
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In fact, Table 1 and, more clearly, Figure 1 does not show any discernible 
general pattern of change in relative citizen congruence across countries. 
While in some countries, like Hungary, Spain, Germany or Lithuania, there 
is a significant increase in congruence during the crisis, in others (Italy and 
Portugal) the opposite pattern is observed. In Bulgaria and France, there was 
hardly any change between 2009 and 2014. 
Figure 2 offers a glimpse to the directionality of the shifts in representatives’ 
and citizens’ positions during the considered period. Again, there is no general 
pattern. For every country we find a different situation. Therefore, the increase 
in congruence in Hungary in 2014 is the consequence of the approximation of 
the average representative’s position to the more Eurosceptic position of the 
median citizen, while in Spain it is a result of the shift of the median citizen to a 
more pro-EU position. In Germany and Portugal, we observe that the respective 
increase and decrease in congruence are not the consequence of a displacement 
of the average positions of representatives or the median citizen, but the result 
from changes in the relative distribution of the positions of the citizens with 
respect to the representative’s average position. In Italy, there is a simultaneous 
divergence in 2014 in the positions of citizens (less pro-EU than in 2009) and 
their representatives (more pro-EU). The opposite occurs in Lithuania, where 
the slight increase in congruence in 2014 seems to be the result of a convergence 
of both representatives and citizens to similar positions. Finally, in France, it 
is evident the stalemate in both representatives’ average and citizens’ median 
positions during the whole period.
With respect to a between-countries comparison, we observe that countries 
with higher average levels of congruence during the period (lower RCCs) are 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Italy (despite the considerable decrease in congruence 
in 2014 in the latter), while those where the preferences of citizens differ the 
most from those of MPs are Spain, Germany and France.12 
12  It is remarkable that, in 2014, MPs from Spain, Italy and Germany were the most enthusiastic 
about the strengthening of the EU integration process (means of 8, 7.9, and 7.6, on the 0-10 scale, 
respectively).
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Figure 1. Many-to-one congruence between citizens and MPs on the EU dimension,  
by country and year (relative citizen congruence)
Note: Lower figures imply higher congruence.
Figure 2. Average representatives’ position vs. median citizens’ position on the EU 
dimension, by country and year
With respect to the many-to-many measure, comparative results are in line 
with those of the RCC. Table 1 shows that the countries where, on average, 
parliaments are more representative of the distribution of citizens’ preferences 
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on the issue of the EU are also Lithuania, Bulgaria and Italy, and those less 
representative are again Spain (though the Spanish parliament in 2014 was 
significantly more representative than in 2007), Germany and France. With 
respect to the other countries, the difference between the average RCC and 
the many-to-many congruence in Hungary is remarkable. Regarding changes 
during the crisis, we observe an acute decrease in the representativeness of the 
Italian Camera dei Deputati in 2014 with respect to 2009 (almost 19.2% less 
overlap between the distribution of citizens’ and MPs’ positions) and in Portugal. 
In contrast, we observe a significant increase in many-to-many congruence in 
Hungary (20.3%) and Germany (12.2%).
Table 3 shows the results of the statistical analyses testing of the three hypotheses 
at a system level. Given the low number of observations, I opted for a bivariate 
approach, using the Mann-Whitney U non-parametric test of differences between 
two groups. This test is applied to the two congruence measures presented above.
Table 3. Bivariate test of hypotheses (system level)
Groups Statistics RCC MTMC
2007 v 2009 Mann-Whitney U 27 20
Z -0.12 -0.93
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.908 0.355
2009 v 2014 Mann-Whitney U 28 31
Z -0.77 -0.48
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.441 0.630
2007 v 2014 Mann-Whitney U 25 25
Z -0.69 -0.69
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.491 0.491
Conditionality v. Not 
conditionality Mann-Whitney U 35 39
Z -0.39 -0.08
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.699 0.938
Old v. New member 
states Mann-Whitney U 26 15
Z -2.47 -3.13
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 0.002
New member states in 
2014 (v. rest) (*) Mann-Whitney U 3 3
Z -1.71 -1.71
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.086 0.086
Note: N=24. RCC: Relative citizen congruence; MTMC: Many-to-many congruence. (*) Only includes  
observations for new member states (N=9).
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Neither of the three hypotheses presented above receive support in this 
system analysis. During the crisis there was no significant change in the 
levels of congruence with respect to the pre-crisis periods. Moreover, in those 
countries more severely hit by the negative economic and social consequences 
of the crisis that had to resort to a financial assistance program, the levels 
of congruence with respect to EU integration are not significantly different 
than those of countries that did not. In addition, the analysis in Table 3 
does not confirm Hypothesis 3 (no change in congruence during the crisis 
between old and new member states). Thus, representatives in new member 
states are, in general, more congruent with their fellow citizens, and during 
the crisis parliaments of the new member states became significantly more 
representative of their respective societies with respect to EU issues (though Z 
scores are statistically significant only at p=0.09).
Concerning congruence at the party level, Table 4 also shows the bivariate 
analyses of the many-to-one congruence variable (relative voter congruence) 
between parties and their voters. Neither Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 are 
confirmed: party congruence is not affected by the crisis nor we observe a 
different pattern in countries subject to conditionality. In the case of Hypothesis 
3, parties in new member states are generally closer to their voters than in old 
member states though, in contrast with the system analysis, there is no difference 
in the degree of congruence in these countries before and after the crisis, so 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed for the party level of analysis.
Table 4. Bivariate test of hypotheses (party level)
Groups Statistics RVC
2007 v. 2009 Mann-Whitney U 224
Z -1.09
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.277
2009 v. 2014 Mann-Whitney U 256
Z -0.65
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.516
2007v 2014 Mann-Whitney U 222
Z -0.70
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.482
Conditionality v. Not conditonality Mann-Whitney U 218
Z -1.38
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.169
Old vs. New member states Mann-Whitney U 311
Z -3.25
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
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New member states in 2014 (v. rest) (*) Mann-Whitney U 85
Z 0.00
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000
Note:  N=70. AMCC: Absolute median citizen congruence; ACC: Absolute citizen congruence; RCC: Relative 
citizen congruence. (*) Only includes observations for new member states (N=27).
These results are confirmed by multivariate analysis. Table 5 shows the 
results for Achen’s (1978) responsiveness and additional models including the 
independent variables of interest. After excluding a very influential observation13, 
all models are statistically significant. 
Table 4. Multivariate test of hypotheses (party level)
Models (1) † (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Average voter 
position (EU)
0.35* 0.35* 0.36* 0.52*** 0.35* 0.36* 0.57***
(0.130) (0.124) (0.132) (0.060) (0.124) (0.131) (0.090)
Year 2014 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.03
(0.141) (0.141) (0.157) (0.273)
Conditionality 0.14 0.14 0.36
(0.403) (0.438) (0.199)
New member 
state
-1.10*** -1.20*
(0.290) (0.422)
New member x 
Year 2014
0.19
(0.591)
Constant 5.04*** 5.01*** 4.94*** 4.44*** 5.01*** 4.94*** 4.13***
(0.802) (0.745) (0.852) (0.295) (0.745) (0.819) (0.476)
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
R-squared 0.085 0.086 0.087 0.330 0.086 0.087 0.344
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.05 0.29
N clusters 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Note: OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. † Achen’s responsiveness; 
*** p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1. Dependent variable: Average party EU position. The reference 
category for ‘Year 2014’ is ‘2007 or 2009’. The reference category for ‘Conditionality’ is ‘Country not subject 
to financial assistance programs’. The reference category for ‘New member state’ is ‘Old member states’ (EU 
members before 2003). 
As indicated above, Achen’s responsiveness measure (Model 1) is the result 
of regressing the average positions of parties on the average positions of voters. 
The constant of the model is 5.04, which indicates that parties are far more 
supportive of EU integration than their average voters (remember that perfect 
13 This observation corresponded to the party Jobbik in 2014.
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congruence would require the constant to be 0). Moreover, the coefficient of the 
average party voter position is statistically significant and lower than 1 (0.35), 
which means that voters’ positions are more polarized on this issue than those 
of parties.
With respect to the models for testing the hypotheses, as in the bivariate 
analysis, only the New member states variable is statistically significant. The 
negative coefficient in the models that include this independent variable (4 
and 7) indicates that the positions of voters and parties are in general,closer 
in those countries (that is, the level of congruence is higher). The interaction 
between New member states and 2014, which tests Hypothesis 3, is 
statistically not significant, confirming such hypothesis, that is, during the 
crisis there was no significant change in the congruence between parties and 
the average voter in new EU member states compared parties in the other 
states. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This article’s  main goal was checking whether the economic and political 
crisis that has affected EU countries since 2009 had any effect on the degree 
of congruence between citizens and their representatives concerning their 
support for European integration. In this respect, the analysis described in 
the previous pages did not detect a general pattern of evolution of congruence 
affecting all the countries in the sample. Therefore, congruence has evolved 
differently depending on the country. This applies both to the many-to-one 
(relative citizen congruence) and the many-to-many views of congruence. 
In addition to the absence of such a general descriptive pattern of evolution 
during the crisis the analysis has also shown that the crisis has not affected 
congruence concerning European integration in the studied countries 
neither at the system (congruence between citizens and their representatives 
considered as a whole) nor at the party level (congruence between parties and 
their voters). This applies even to those countries most affected by the negative 
economic consequences of the crisis – those subject to financial assistance 
programmes. 
These results suggest that, in general terms, the crisis did not activate a process 
of convergence between citizens and their representatives concerning European 
integration in the countries under analysis. As it occurred before 2009, during 
the crisis parliamentary elites remained, in general terms, significantly more 
pro-EU than the citizens or voters they represented (see Figures A1 and A2 in 
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the Appendix). This stability could be interpreted as a manifestation of the lack 
of attraction of the EU dimension as a field of political dispute, at least for most 
of those European parties with higher shares of seats of the parliament – which 
are those included in the analysis according to the selection criterion I have used 
(see above). Therefore, it seems that there is still room for politicization of the 
EU dimension in most of these countries.  
The previous analysis has also detected a difference in the congruence patterns 
between old and new EU member states. Both at a system and a party level, 
representatives in new EU member states are closer to the positions of their fellow 
citizens and voters. Moreover, this general pattern has not changed during the 
crisis. This result is at odds with those obtained by Mattila and Raunio (2012), 
which detected in 2009 that levels of congruence in parties in new member states 
decreased below those in old members, reversing the situation the same authors 
found in the 2004 European Parliament election (Mattila and Raunio 2006). The 
only explanation I find for this discrepancy is the different data sources used by 
these authors (European Election Survey), the different sample size (they include 
all 27 member states) and the different operationalization of representatives’ 
positions (they use voters’ assessments of parties’ positions). So Mattila and 
Raunio’s (2012) results, in fact, confirm that perceptions of distances between 
voters and the parties they voted for concerning EU integration grew in new 
member states in 2009 compared to the same perceptions in 2004. In this study, 
what I have shown is that (though data are limited to a less numerous group 
of countries) actual positions of parliamentary representatives in new member 
states concerning EU integration are generally much closer to the positions of 
their fellow citizens/voters than in the case of representatives in old member 
states. And this pattern has not changed during the considered period.
In sum, the situation in terms of congruence between citizens/voters and 
their representatives concerning the EU is pretty much the same that it was 
before the crisis. Of course, this conclusion is must be taken with caution, 
given the reduced number of countries and the way positions concerning the 
EU positions are operationalized, focusing only on the general level of support 
for the advancement of European integration. Therefore, it is possible that in 
other relevant aspects concerning the EU and its performance during the crisis 
(for instance, the evaluation of the functioning of EU institutions or specific 
preferences on the Europeanization of policy making) another picture may 
emerge. At this moment, however, we do not have the data to provide an answer 
to this question. 
In this respect, I would like to make a final remark regarding the data I 
have used. Using data from elite surveys to study congruence has a particular 
disadvantage: these are data very costly to produce. This may make other 
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sources of information much more attractive to researchers in terms of cost-
effectiveness. Nevertheless, I think the price is worth to pay if we consider 
that using different sources may produce different conclusions (as in the case 
of the results obtained above for the new member states); and that neither of 
the alternative data sources provide a more accurate picture of the positions of 
representatives (particularly, if we compare data from elite surveys to citizens’ 
placements of parties).
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Data in the analyses (number of interviews in the corresponding surveys)
ESS round INTUNE-ENEC elite survey
ESS-3 ESS-4 ESS-6
Total 
citizens
INTUNE 
-2007
INTUNE 
-2009
ENEC-
2014
Total 
MPs
Bulgaria 1400 2230 2260 5890 83 76 53 212
France 1986 2073 1968 6027 81 68 46 195
Germany 2916 2751 2958 8625 80 79 70 229
Hungary 1603 1544 2014 5161 80 72 57 209
Italy 1012 (*) 1002 (*) 960 960 84 70 82 236
Lithuania - 2002 2109 4111 - 70 54 124
Portugal 2222 2367 2151 6740 80 68 81 229
Slovenia - - 1257 1257 - - 50 50
Spain 1877 2576 1889 6342 94 81 81 256
Total 13016 16545 17566 45113 662 584 574 1820
Note: ESS data are weighted. (*) These data correspond to the INTUNE mass surveys. Source: Author’s 
elaboration using ESS and INTUNE-ENEC datasets.
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Table A2. Parties in the analysis by year
Country Party name 2007 2009 2014
Bulgaria
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) x x
National Union Attack (Ataka) x
National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) x x
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB) x
United Democratic Forces (ODS) x
Citizens for European Development (GERB) x
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) x
France
Parti Socialiste (PS) x x x
Union pour une Majorité Populaire (UMP) x x x
Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) x
Germany
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland-SPD x x x
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen x x x
Christlich Demokratische Union-CSU x x x
Freie Demokratische Partei  – FDP x x
Hungary
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség x x x
Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) x x x
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége  – SZDSZ x
Jobbik x
Italy
Forza Italia (FI) x
Alleanza Nazionale  – An x
L’Ulivo x
Rifondazione Comunista  – Rc x
Unione di Centro  – UdC x x
Lega Nord x
Popolo della Libertà (PDL) x
Partito Democratico (PD) x
Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) x
Lithuania
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) x x
Lithuanian Homeland Union-Christian Democrats (TS-
LKD) x x
Order and Justice (TT) x
Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS) x
Party of National Progress (TPP) x
Labor Party (DP) x
Portugal Partido Socialista (PS) x x x
Partido Social Democrata (PSD) x x x
Spain Partido Popular (PP) x x x
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) x x x
Slovenia Socialni demokrati (SD) x
Slovenska Demokratska Stranka (SDS) x
Note: The parties included in the analysis are those in which at least 25 party voters and 5 MPs were 
interviewed in ESS and INTUNE-ENEC surveys, respectively.
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Figure A1. Bias in representatives’ average position vs. median citizen’s position on 
the EU dimension, by country and year
Note: Bias is calculated as the difference of representatives’ average position minus the median citizen 
position. Positive scores indicate that representatives have a more pro-EU position than citizens; negative 
scores convey the opposite meaning. Source: INTUNE and ENEC elite surveys; ESS rounds 3, 4, and 6 (see 
Table 1 for more information about fieldwork)
Figure A2. Bias in parties’ average position vs. median voter’s position on the EU 
dimension, by country and year
Note: Bias is calculated as the difference of party representatives’ average position minus the party’s median 
voter position. Positive scores indicate that party representatives have a more pro-EU position than voters; 
negative scores convey the opposite meaning. Source: INTUNE and ENEC elite surveys; ESS rounds 3, 4, and 
6 (see Table 1 for more information about fieldwork)
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